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Abstract
RAID (Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks) are widely
used in storage servers. Level-5 RAID is one of the most
popular RAID architectures. Numerical analysis of exact
Markovian dependability models of level-5 RAID architec-
tures with orthogonal organization is unfeasible formany re-
alisticmodel parameters due to the size of the resulting state
space. In this paper we develop approximate dependability
models for a level-5 RAID architecture with orthogonal or-
ganization which have small state spaces. We consider two
measures: the steady-state unavailability and the unrelia-
bility. The models encompass disk hot spares and imperfect
disk reconstruction. Using bounding techniques we analyze
the accuracy of the models and show that the models are
extremely accurate.
1. Introduction
Increased performance in processors and memory sub-
systems have made the I/O subsystem the bottleneck of
computer systems in many applications. Dependability of
the I/O subsystem is also a major concern in many appli-
cations such as on-line transaction processing. RAID (Re-
dundantArray of Inexpensive Disks) provide an inexpensive
valuable alternative to improve the performance and depend-
ability of the I/O subsystem [11]. RAID can be composed
of a large number of disks and incorporate redundancy to
achieve high dependability. Several organizations, called
levels, are available with different degrees of redundancy.
The ﬁrst RAID taxonomy [10] included levels 1 through 5,
but since then, levels 0 and 6 have also been widely accepted
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[3]. Level 5 is a popular RAID architecture. Many studies
about the performance of that architecture are available, e.g.
[6, 7, 15]. A number of studies have dealt with the depend-
ability of RAID. Most of them have considered an approxi-
mate computation of themean time to failure [4, 5, 9, 10, 14].
More detailed dependability models [13] have been devel-
oped recently usingStochastic ActivityNetworks [12]. This
paper is concerned with dependability modeling of level-
5 RAID architectures with orthogonal organizations using
continuous-timeMarkov chains (CTMCs).
Exact CTMC dependability models of level-5 RAID ar-
chitectures with orthogonal organization are complex and
have enormous state spaces when the RAID contains a large
number of disks. In this paper we develop approximate
CTMC dependability models for such level-5 RAID archi-
tectures and analyze their accuracy. We consider unavail-
ability and reliabilitymodels. The models generalize the re-
liabilitymodel proposed in [13] by encompassing hot spare
controllers and yield small state spaces. The accuracy of
the models is assessed analytically by using CTMC models
withmuch greater state spaces yielding bounds for the exact
dependability. It is found that the approximate models are
very accurate, yielding about 6 signiﬁcant digits. We want
to emphasize that validation of such a degree of accuracy
could not have been obtained using simulation. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de-
scribe the approximate models and discuss intuitively why
they should be quite accurate. In Section 3 we describe the
bounding CTMC models and using them analyze the accu-
racy of the approximate models. Section 4 summarizes the
main conclusions.
2. Approximate Dependability Models
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the considered level-5
RAID system. The system includes G  N disks and N
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Figure 1. Architecture of the considered level-5 RAID
system.
controllers. The disks are organized in G parity groups,
each with N disks. Each controller controls a string of G
disks. The system also includes C
H
hot spare controllers
and D
H
hot spare disks. The system is operational if there
is access to at least N     available disks of each parity
group. When there is a failed controller all disks of the
associated string become unavailable. When a failed disk is
replaced by a good one and if all disks of the parity group
are available, the parity group starts the reconstruction of
data in the replaced disk. The reconstruction process also
starts when a disk of a parity group which was not available
due to failure of one controller becomes available due to the
replacement of the failed controller. All disks of the par-
ity group involved in a reconstruction are “overloaded” and
have a higher failure rate. Non-overloaded disks fail with
rate  
D
. Overloaded disks fail with rate  
S
. Controllers fail
with rate  
C
. The reconstruction process has an exponential
duration with rate 
DRC
. Failed disks and controllers are
replaced, if respective hot spares are available, by a repair-
man with rates 
DRP
and 
CRP
, respectively, with priority
given to controllers and random selection among the failed
components of highest priority. Lacking spares and failed
disks and controllers for which there are not spares are re-
placed with rate 
SR
by an unlimited number of repairmen.
A reconstruction process is successful with probability P
R
.
Failure in a reconstruction process causes the failure of the
system. Finally, when the system is failed, it is returned to
its original state, with all disks and hot spares available, by
a global repair action which has rate 
G
.
The exact previously described model gives CTMCswith
very large state spaces even formoderate values ofG andN .
The reason is that in order to know howmany controller fail-
ures cause a system failure it is necessary to know whether
the unavailable disks are aligned (belong to the same string)
or not, since in the ﬁrst case N     controller failures will
cause system failure, and in the second case allN controller
failures will cause system failure. To know whether the un-
available disks are aligned or not in the presence of repairs
it is necessary to know how many disks are unavailable in
each string, and such a detailed state description gives raise
to an exploition in the size of the state space whenG and N
increase. In this section we will describe approximate mod-
els which have much smaller state spaces. The approxima-
tion consists in assuming, pessimistically, that if unavailable
disks are unaligned they will remain unaligned when one of
them becomes available whenever the number of remaining
unavailable disks is  . Using that approximation it is
possible to describe the state of the CTMC using the fol-
lowing state variables: NFD (number of failed disks), NDR
(number of disks under reconstruction), NWD (number of
disks waiting for reconstruction), NSD (number of hot spare
disks), AL (a boolean variable which is true when unavail-
able disks are aligned and false otherwise), NFC (number of
failed controllers), NSC (number of hot spare controllers),
and F (a boolean variable which is true when the system is
failed and falseotherwise). Such a succinct description gives
state spaceswhose size is independent onN ( ) and grows
moderately with G. Figures 2–4 give a formal description
of the approximate model for the steady-state unavailabil-
ity using the model speciﬁcation language of METFAC-2.1
[1]. State changes are speciﬁed by production rules which
model actions and have associated rates. In addition, an ac-
tionmay have several responses, which may have associated
probabilities. The CTMC is generated from the start state
by applying production rules. The reward construct assigns
reward rates to states of the CTMC. The speciﬁcation sets
the reward rate of the down state (F  yes) to 1 and the
reward rate of the up states to 0. With that reward rate struc-
ture, the generic measure “Expected Steady-State Reward
Rate” is the steady-state unavailability of the system. The
speciﬁcation required to compute the unreliability at time t
is obtained from the one given in the ﬁgures by removing the
functional parameter MUG and the production rule modeling
the global repair action, and associating a reward rate 1 with
the system up states. With that reward rate structure, the
generic measure “Cumulative Reward DistributionTill Exit
of a subset of states” (entry in the absorbing state) is the
system unreliability at time t.
Intuitively, it is clear that the approximate models should
be quite accurate. The reason is that they differ from the
exact models only following repair from states in which
there are non-aligned unavailable disks, which will be rare.
However, how good is the approximation? That question
will be answered in the following section. We want to note
that the approximate model gives CTMCs with small state
spaces. To illustrate the point we give in Table 1 the number
of states and number of transitions for the model used in the
computation of the steady-state unavailability for several
values ofG, C
H
and D
H
.
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Figure 2. Formal description of the approximate model
using the METFAC-2.1 model speciﬁcation language.
Table 1. Size of the resulting CTMC for the approximate
model for the steady-state unavailability for several values
ofG, C
H
andD
H
.
G C
H
D
H
states transitions
5 1 2 271 1,464
5 2 3 541 3,037
10 1 2 841 5,009
10 2 3 1,681 10,427
20 1 2 2,881 18,249
20 2 3 5,761 38,107
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Figure 3. Formal description of the approximate model
using the METFAC-2.1 model speciﬁcation language (con-
tinuation).
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Figure 4. Formal description of the approximate model
using the METFAC-2.1 model speciﬁcation language (con-
tinuation).
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3. Model Validation
In this section we validate the approximate models de-
scribed in the previous section in the sense of showing that,
for typical model parameter values, they are highly accurate.
As already pointed out, the exact models yield CTMCs with
have unmanageable state spaces and, thus, validation can-
not be accomplished by comparing the approximate models
with the exact models. Instead, we will use bounding tech-
niques to get the solution of the exact models with a high
enough degree of accuracy. The advantage of using bound-
ing techniques is that the size of the CTMCs which have to
be solved is substantially smaller than the size of theCTMCs
resulting from the exact models.
3.1 Bounding model for the steady-state unavail-
ability
We start by providing a brief review of the bounding
technique we will use to obtain bounds for the steady-state
unavailability. The technique uses theoretical results re-
cently obtained [2, 8]. Let X   fXt t   g be the
CTMC under consideration and denote by S its state space.
Let  
i j
, i j  S, j   i denote the transition rate of X
from state i to state j, let  
i
 
P
j Sfig
 
i j
denote the
output rate of X from state i, and, being B a subset of S,
let  
i B
 
P
j B
 
i j
. The bounding technique requires
the deﬁnition of a partition
 kN
C
k
of the state space S
and works well when transition rates to the right, i.e. from
C
k
to 
klN
C
l
are relatively small compared with the
transition rates to the left, i.e. fromC
k
to
 lk
C
l
. The
technique as reviewed here requires thatC
 
has a single state
r. Bounds are computed using a CTMC Y   fY t t   g
with state spaceGfc

 c

     c
N
g,G   
K
k 
C
k
, where
K is a bounding parameter, typically much smaller thanN .
The accuracy of the bounds increases with K. Transition
rates in Y between states ofG are as inX. Y has transition
rates from states i  G to states c
k
with rates  
i C
k
. In
addition, Y has transition rates f
k l
from c
k
to c
l
, l  k,
transition rates g
k
from c
k
to c
k
, k   , and a transi-
tion rate g

from c

to r. The transition rate f
k l
has to
upper bound  
i C
l
, i  C
k
, l  k. If all states in C
k
have
transition to the left we can take a g
k
  lower bounding
 
i 
  l k
C
l
, i  C
k
. We can also take a g
k
  lower
boundingmin
i C
K
q
i
h
i
, where q
i
is the probability thatX
will exit C
k
by the left assuming entry in C
k
through i and
h
i
is the mean holding time in C
k
assuming entry through
i. Using Y , we can obtain a lower and an upper bound
for the steady-state reward rate of X by assigning to the
states in G the same reward rate as in X and for the states
c
k
, respectively, a lower bound and an upper bound for the
reward rates of X. The steady-state reward rate obtained
for Y using the lower bound reward rate in c
k
is the desired
lower bound and the steady-state reward rate obtained for Y
using the upper bound reward rate in c
k
is the desired upper
bound. For the steady-state unavailability, convenient lower
and upper bound reward rates to be assigned to the states c
k
are 0 and 1, respectively.
To apply the previous bounding technique we have to
select a suitable partition of S. For the bounds to be good
with moderate values of K and, thus, with moderate state
spaces of Y , the partition should be chosen so that states
belonging to subsets C
k
with increasing k be progressively
rarer; in addition transition rates to the right should be much
smaller than transition rates to the left. Let U be the subset
of up states of S. S   U  ffg, where f is the single
system failed state. For a state i  U , let N
FC
i be the
number of failed controllers, let N
FD
i be the number of
failed disks, let N
DR
i be the number of disks under re-
construction, let N
WD
i be the number of disks waiting
for reconstruction, let N
SC
i be the number of hot spare
controllers, and letN
SD
i be the number of hot spare disks,
all in i. At ﬁrst glance, a reasonable partition is C
 
  frg,
C

  ffg  fi  U  N
FC
i  N
FD
i  N
DR
i 
N
WD
i  C
H
 N
SC
i  D
H
 N
SD
i   g, and
C
k
  fi  U  N
FC
i N
FD
i N
DR
i N
WD
i 
C
H
 N
SC
i  D
H
 N
SD
i   kg, k  . However
that “natural” partition has two problems. The ﬁrst one is
that the replacement of a failed disk with a hot spare, which
has a fast rate, originates transitions to the right (D
H
N
SD
is increased by one, N
FD
is decreased by one, and either
N
DR
or N
WD
is increased by one). The second one is that
N
WD
imay have high values with quite a high probability,
since it is enough a controller failure to take the system to
a state i withN
WD
i equal to the the number of disks pre-
viously unfailed in the string associated with the controller.
Thus, in order to have tight bounds we should take forK at
least thevalueG, which is close toN   GC
H
D
H
,
and thus gives enormous state spaces. The ﬁrst problem can
be solved by taking D
H
 N
SD
out of the deﬁnition of the
index k deﬁning the partition when thera are failed disks.
In order to solve the second problem, it is necessary to
differentiate the disks under reconstruction or waiting for
reconstruction as a result of a disk failure, or those which
are in those states as a result of a controller failure. Then, let
N
DRF
i andN
WDF
i be, respectively, the number of disks
under reconstruction or waiting for reconstruction as a result
of the failure of the disk, and letN
DRC
i andN
WDC
i be,
respectively, the number of disks under reconstruction or
waiting for reconstruction as a result of a controller failure,
all in state i. Then, while we have to generate states i with
high values ofN
DRC
i andN
WDC
iwe only have to gen-
erate states withmoderate values ofN
DRF
i andN
WDF
i.
Another comment is that disks under reconstruction due to
a controller failure are the result of a controller failure and
disappear with fast rates and we can think of the reconstruc-
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tion of those disks as part of the “repair” engaged when the
controller fails. Thus, we should count as one pending fail-
ure the fact that there are disks under reconstruction due to
a controller failure. Doing so requires, in order not to have
fast rates to the right, to leave out of the counter deﬁning the
partition the number of lacking hot spare controllers. Using
those ideas we deﬁne the following partition:
C
 
  frg  
and, denotingby I
c
the indicator function returning thevalue
1when condition c is true and 0otherwise, forC
H
D
H
 ,
C

  ffg
 fi  U  N
FC
i  N
FD
i N
DRF
i N
WDF
i
I
N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
  
 C
H
N
SC
i  D
H
 N
SD
i   g  
C
k
 
fi  U  N
FC
i  N
FD
i  N
DRF
i N
WDF
i
I
N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
  
 C
H
 N
SC
i  D
H
 N
SD
i   kg  
  k  C
H
D
H
 
C
C
H
D
H
k
 
fi  U  N
FC
i  N
FD
i  N
DRF
i N
WDF
i
I
N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
  kg  
  k  G   
and, for C
H
D
H
  ,
C

  ffg
 fi  U  N
FC
i  N
FD
i N
DRF
i N
WDF
i
I
N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
  g  
C
k
 
fi  U  N
FC
i  N
FD
i  N
DRF
i N
WDF
i
I
N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
  kg  
  k  G  
Using that partition, tight bounds can be obtained by tak-
ingK   C
H
D
H
M , whereM has amoderate value, say
from 3 to 5. In order to generate Y , it is necessary to keep
track of N
DRF
i, N
DRC
i and N
WDF
i, which requires
to introduce for each string of the RAID counters of the
number of disks under reconstruction due to failure of the
disk, under reconstruction due to failure of the controller,
waiting for reconstruction due to failure of the disk, and
waiting for reconstruction due to failure of the controller.
That reﬁnement of the state description enlarges consider-
ably the number of states of X, but is well paid-off by the
decrease in size of the state space of Y .
It remains to obtain values for the transition rates f
kl
and g
k
of Y . We start with f
kl
. Given the deﬁnition of the
partition, only failure transitions which do not cause system
failurego to the right. Thus, in order to compute f
kl
we only
have to consider failure transition rates, which, as desired,
are small. To compute f
kl
,   k  C
H
D
H
we note that
states in C
k
,   k  C
H
D
H
have transitions to the right
only to C
C
H
D
H

. Those transitions may originate from
controller failures whose rate is N
C
and by disk failures
not causing system failure, whose rate is GN
D
. Thus, for
  k  C
H
D
H
, we can take
f

kC
H
D
H

  N
C
GN
D

States in C
k
, C
H
 D
H
   k  C
H
 D
H
 G have
transitions to the right only to C
k
. Those transitions
may originate from controller failures whose rate is upper
bounded by N
C
and by disk failures not causing system
failure. The rate of those disk failures is upper bounded by
max
 kG
k
S
 G  kN
D
if no controller is failed
and bymax
 kG
k
D
if one controller is failed. Thus, for
C
H
D
H
   k  C
H
D
H
 G, we can take
f

kk
  N
C
max
n
max
 kG
k
S
 G kN
D
 
max
 kG
k
D
o
  N
C
maxfG
S
  GN
D
  G
D
g
  N
C
maxfG
S
  GN
D
g   f


We next proceed with the computation of g
k
. We start
discussing the case C
H
D
H
  and   k  C
H
D
H
.
Within that case we will start discussing the case k   .
State f has transition to the left with rate 
G
. The other
states of C

have one lacking hot spare controller or disk
and thus have a transition to the left with rate 
SR
. Then,
for the case C
H
D
H
  we can take
g


  minf
G
  
SR
g 
For   k  C
H
D
H
, the states i  C
k
have k hot spare
replacements underway and have transition rate to the left
of value k
SR
. Thus, we can take
g

k
  k
SR

It remains to discuss the case C
H
 D
H
   k 
C
H
D
H
G . We will not distinguish in that case the
subcases C
H
 D
H
  and C
H
 D
H
  , except that,
for C
H
 D
H
   and k   , C

includes state f . For
k   C
H
 D
H
 G   all states in C
k
have one failed
controller and C
H
lacking controller hot spares. Since there
are not available controller hot spares, the failed controller
is repaired by themaintenance team at rate 
SR
. In addition,
lacking hot spares are brought at rate C
H
D
H

SR
. Both
types of transitions go to the left. Therefore, we can take
g

C
H
D
H
G
  C
H
D
H
 
SR

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It remains to consider the case C
H
  D
H
     k  
C
H
 D
H
 G. For those values of k, up states i in C
k
with
N
FC
i  , N
FD
i   , N
DRF
i  , N
WDF
 , and
N
DRC
i   have no fast transition to the left, and taking
a lower bound for the minimum of the transition rates to the
left would give a poor g 
k
. For those values of k we will
take a g 
k
lower bounding min
iC
k
q
i
h
i
, where q
i
is the
probability that C
k
will be left by the left starting in state i
and h
i
is the mean holding time in C
k
starting in state i. In
order to compute lower bounds for q
i
and upper bounds for
h
i
we will need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let Z be a transient CTMC with state space
Sfa
L
 a
R
g, where a
L
and a
R
are absorbing states and all
states in S are transient, and P Z  S  . Let P
L

lim
t
P Xt  a
L
 and P
R
 lim
t
P Xt  a
R

(P
L
and P
R
are, respectively, the probabilities that Z will
be absorbed in a
L
and a
R
). Denote by g
i
the transition rate
from i  S to a
L
and denote by f
i
the transition rate from
i  S to a
R
. Assume g
i
  , i  S, let g    min
iS
g
i
,
g
 
  , and let f   max
iS
f
i
. Then, P
L
 g
 
g
 
 
f
 
.
Proof Let 
i
, i  S be the mean time to absorption in i of
Z. We have
P
L

X
iS

i
g
i
 (1)
P
R

X
iS

i
f
i
 (2)
From (2)
P
R
 
 
X
iS

i

f
 

X
iS

i

P
R
f
 
 (3)
From (1) and (3)
P
L

 
X
iS

i

g
 
 P
R
g
 
f
 

Using P
L
  P
R
 
P
L
  P
L

g
 
f
 

P
L

  
g
 
f
 


g
 
f
 

P
L

g
 
f
 
  
g
 
f
 

g
 
g
 
  f
 

Lemma 2. Let Z be a transient CTMC with state space
S  fag, where a is an absorbing state and all states in S
are transient, and P Z  S  . Let g
i
, i  S denote
the transition rate from i to a, assume g
i
  , i  S, and
let g    min
iS
g
i
, g
 
  . Let h 
P
iS
R


P Zt 
i dt be the mean time to absorption of Z. Then, h   g .
Proof Let p
i
t  P Zt  i, i  S. Let pt 
P
iS
p
i
t. We have
dp
dt
 
X
iS
p
i
tg
i

Deﬁne
gt 
X
iS
p
i
tg
i
pt

We have
dp
dt
 gtpt  (4)
The solution of (4) (p  ) is
pt  e
 
R
t
 
g  d 

But gt  g  and
pt  e
 g
 
t
 (5)
Integrating (5)
h 
Z

o
pt dt 
Z


e
 g
 
t
dt 

g
 

To derive g 
k
for C
H
  D
H
     k   C
H
 D
H
  G
we assume k    for the case C
H
 D
H
  and deﬁne the
following partition of C
k
(note that all states in C
k
belong
to U , i.e. are up states)
C

k
 fi  C
k
 N
FC
i    N
DRC
i   g 
C

k
 fi  C
k
 N
FC
i  g 
C

k
 fi  C
k
 N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
N
DRF
i   g 
C

k
 fi  C
k
 N
FC
i    N
DRC
i  
N
DRF
i  g 
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We will derive lower bounds for min
i C
l
k
q
i
 h
i
for each
subset C l
k
of the partition and g
k
will be the minimum of
all those lower bounds.
AssumeC 
k
   and consider i  C 
k
. Let j   N
DRC
i.
State i may not have fast transition to the left if j  . Con-
sider the partition of C 
k

 lG
C
 
k l
, where C 
k l
includes
the states of C 
k
with N
DRC
i   l. States in subset C 
k l
,
l   have only transitions to the left, to the right and to
C
 
k l 
, the transition rates to the right are upper bounded
by f and the transition rates to the left or to C 
k l 
are
lower bounded by l
DRC
. States in the subset C 
k  
have
only transitions to the left and to the right, the transition
rates to the right are upper bounded by f and the transition
rates to the left are lower bounded by 
DRC
. Consider any
state s  C 
k l
, let q
s l
be the probability that X will make
a jump to the left or, if l  , to C 
k l 
starting in state s,
and let h
s l
be the mean holding time in C 
k l
starting in s.
Using Lemmas 1–2 we have
q
s l

l
DRC
l
DRC
 f


h
s l


l
DRC

Obviously, q
i
is lower bounded by the product of the lower
bounds for q
s j
 q
s j 
     q
s  
and h
i
is upper bounded
by the sum of the upper bounds for h
s j
 h
s j 
     h
s  
.
This gives
q
i

j
Y
l 
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f


h
i

j
X
l 

l
DRC

Thus, taking into account that j may vary between 1 andG,
assuming C 
k
  , we have
min
i C
 
k
q
i
h
i
 min
 jG
j
Y
l 
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f

j
X
l 

l
DRC
 
G
Y
l 
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f

G
X
l 

l
DRC

(6)
Assume now C
k
   and consider i  C
k
. If N
SC
i 
 the failed controller will be replaced by a hot spare at rate

CRP
; if N
SC
i    the failed controller will be repaired
by themaintenance team at rate 
SR
. Summarizing, we will
have a rate to C 
k
or to the left from i and all states within
C

k
reachable from i  
min 
  minf
CRP
 
SR
g. Let q
i
be the probability that starting in i X will make a jump to
C
 
k
or to the left and let h
i
be the mean holding time in C
k
starting in i. Using Lemmas 1–2 we have
q

i


min 

min 
 f


h

i



min 

Assume that there is a jump from i to C 
k
and let s be the
entry state. Let j   N
DRC
s. Let q 
s
be the probability
that there will be an exit to the left starting in s and let h 
s
be the mean holding time in C 
k
starting in s. Following the
previous developments we have
q
 
s

j
Y
l 
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f


h
 
s

j
X
l 

l
DRC

It is clear that q
i
is lower bounded by the product of the lower
bound for q
i
and the lower bound for q 
s
, which achieves
its minimum for j   G. Also, h
i
is upper bounded by the
sum of the upper bound for h
i
and the upper bound for h 
s
,
which achieves its maximum for j   G. Then, assuming
C

k
  , we have
min
i C

k
q
i
h
i


min 

min 
 f

G
Y
l 
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f



min 

G
X
l 

l
DRC
 (7)
AssumeC
k
   and consider i  C
k
. Let j   N
DRF
i.
All states inC
k
reachable withinC
k
from i have a transition
rate to the left j
DRC
. The transition rates to the right are
upper bounded by f . Then, using Lemmas 1–2 we have
q
i

j
DRC
j
DRC
 f


h
i


j
DRC

Noting that j varies between 1 and G, we obtain, assuming
C

k
  
min
i C

k
q
i
h
i
 min
 jG
j
DRC
j
DRC
 f

j
DRC
 

DRC

DRC
 f


DRC
 (8)
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Finally, assume C 
k
   and consider i  C 
k
. State i
has no fast transition to the left. We have N
FD
i   . If
there are hot spare disks available, disk repair will occur at
a rate lower bounded by 
DRP
. If there are hot spare disks
available, disk repair will occur at rate lower bounded by

SR
. Thus, disk repair will occur at rate lower bounded by

min
  minf
DRP
 
SR
g. Upon repair, a state in C
k
will
be entered and adisk reconstructionwill start. Summarizing,
states inC 
k
reachable withinC 
k
have only transitions toC
k
,
to the left, and to the right. The transition rate to C
k
or to
the left of those states is lower bounded by 
min
. The
transition rate to the right is upper bounded by f . Then,
denoting by q 
i
the probability that, starting in i, C 
k
will be
exited by C
k
or the left, and by h 
i
the mean holding time in
C
 
k
starting in i, using Lemmas 1–2 we have
q
 
i


min

min
 f


h
 
i



min

Assume that there is a jump toC
k
and let s be the entry state
in that subset. We have N
DRF
s    and the states in C
k
reachable within C
k
from s have a transition rate to the left
 
DRC
. The transition rates to the right are upper bounded
by f. Then, denoting by q
s
the probability that given entry
by s C
k
will be exited by the left and byh
s
the mean holding
time in C
k
given entry by s, using Lemmas 1–2 we have
q

s


DRC

DRC
 f


h

s



DRC

Now, q
i
is lower bounded by the product of the lower bound
for q 
i
and the lower bound for q
s
and h
i
is upper bounded
by the sum of the upper bound for h 
i
and the upper bound
for h
s
. Then, we have
q
i


min

min
 f


DRC

DRC
 f


h
i



min



DRC

The, assuming C 
k
  
min
i C
 
k
q
i
h
i


min

min
 f


DRC

DRC
 f


min

DRC

min
 
DRC

(9)
Finally, using (6), (7), (8), and (9), we can take, for
C
H
D
H
   k  G C
H
D
H
,
g

k
 
min
 







G
Y
l
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f

G
X
l

l
DRC


min

min
 f

G
Y
l
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f



min

G
X
l

l
DRC


DRC

DRC
 f


DRC


min

min
 f


DRC

DRC
 f


min

DRC

min
 
DRC

  min
 








min

min
 f

G
Y
l
l
DRC
l
DRC
 f



min

G
X
l

l
DRC


min

min
 f


DRC

DRC
 f


min

DRC

min
 
DRC


It remains to discuss the case C
H
D
H
  , k   . In
that case, C
k
includes state f . That state has a transition
to the left with rate 
G
and no other transition. Therefore,
we have q
f
   and h
f
  
G
, which yields q
f
h
f
 

G
. Therefore, in that case it is enough to take for g

the
minimum of the above expression and 
G
.
We have completed the description of the bounding
CTMC Y . Speciﬁcation of Y using the modeling language
of METFAC-2.1 depends on N and is cumbersome. Thus,
for N    the model speciﬁcation ﬁle had 2,223 lines. In
addition, the CTMCs Y are large. Table 2 gives the number
of states and transitions of Y for some set of the parameters
G,N , C
H
, D
H
and M on which the structure of Y depends
used in the validation experiments.
3.2 Bounding model for the unreliability
Obtaining bounds for the unreliability is conceptually
much simpler than for the steady-state unavailability. The
boundingCTMCY has state spaceGff ag,where f is the
absorbing system failed state, a is another absorbing state
and G   
kM
C
k
, where C
k
  fi  U  N
FC
i 
N
FD
iN
DRF
iN
WDF
iI
N
FC
i  N
DRC
i 
 
kg. Transition rates withinG and fromG to f in Y are as in
X; in addition, Y has transition rates from states i  G to
a with rates 
iUG
. A lower bound for the unreliability at
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Table 2. Size of bounding model Y for the steady-state
unavailability for several sets of values of G, N , C
H
, D
H
andM .
G N C
H
D
H
M states transitions
5 5 1 2 4 25,816 188,795
5 10 1 2 4 292,066 2,336,490
10 5 1 2 4 68,721 522,655
10 10 1 2 4 823,371 6,782,950
15 5 1 2 4 111,626 856,515
15 10 1 2 4 1,354,676 11,229,410
20 5 1 2 4 154,531 1,119,375
20 19 1 2 4 1,885,981 15,675,870
time t is P  Y t  f ; an upper bound is P  Y t   ff  ag.
The size of Y is slightly smaller than the size of the Y used
for the steady-state unavailabilitywith the same value ofM .
3.3 Analysis of the accuracy of the approximate
model
In order to asses the accuracy of the approximate models
we used the bounding techniques with the minimum M
required to have an accuracy of 8 digits in the solution of the
exact models. Those solutionswere then compared with the
solutions given by the approximate models and the relative
errors were computed. For the analysis we took C
H
 ,
D
H
 , 
D
 
  
, 
S
   
  
, 
C
   
  
,

DRC
 , 
DRP
 	,
CRP
 	, 
SR
 ,
G
 ,
P
R
 


, and varied the parametersG andN . ForGwe
considered the values 5, 10, 15, and 20; forN we considered
the values 5 and 10. All rates have been given in h . The
modelswere solved on aworkstationwith a Sun-Blade-1000
processor and 4 GB of memory.
Table 3 gives the results obtained for the steady-state
unavailability. We give the value obtained with the approx-
imate model, the exact value (up to 8 signiﬁcant digits) and
the relative error. Tables 4 and 5 gives the results obtained
for the unreliability for, respectively, t   h and t  8,760 h
(1 year). The relative errors increase with both G and N
and are signiﬁcantly smaller for the unreliability at t   h.
The accuracy of the approximate models is better than 5
signiﬁcant digits in all cases examined. For larger values of
G andN we can expect an increase in the relative errors but
the accuracy of the approximate models would still remain
excellent for all reallistic values of G and N .
4. Conclusions
We have developed approximate dependability models
for a level-5 RAID architecture with orthogonal organiza-
Table 5. Analysis of the accuracy of the approximate
model for the unreliability at t   8,760h.
G N approximate exact rel. error
5 5     
5 10 	 		   
10 5 

 

 	  
10 10 	 			   
15 5 	 		   
15 10 

 
   
20 5 
 
   
20 10 	
	 	
	   
tion. The approximate models are parametric on both the
number of parity groups and the number of strings of the ar-
chitecture, have a succinct speciﬁcation, yield CTMCs with
small state spaces, and their accuracy is excellent. Valida-
tion of the degree of accuracy exhibited by the approximate
models would have been impossible using simulation and
has been carried out using bounding techniques recently
developed. Although such a techniques allow to compute
rigorous bounds for the dependabilitymeasures, they require
much more cumbersome model speciﬁcations than the ap-
proximate models and require the solution of CTMCs of
much larger state spaces. Thus, the approximate models
developed in the paper are an attractive alternative for the
evaluation of the dependability of level-5 RAID architec-
tures.
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